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There are tides and fashions in scholarship. Not so long ago, 
learned men taught that judicial review had been conceived in sin, 
served mainly the rich, and was incompatible with democracy. The 
prime proponents of these views-J. Allen Smith, Charles Beard, 
and Brooks Adams-have now lost much of their following. Today 
learned men-Charles Black, Eugene Rostow, and many others-
have no qualms about the origins of the judicial veto, and consider 
it a vital handmaiden of democracy. What used to be called "judi-
cial supremacy," "the divine right of judges," "judicial oligarchy," 
and "the artistocracy of the robe" is now deemed harmonious with 
(and in some quarters even a "legitimating" agent for) government 
by the people.' No one suggests this dramatic change springs from 
new primary source material or from fresh insights as to the mean-
ing of democracy. Surely the catalyst was simply the rise of the 
Warren Court. 
There had been earlier episodes, but modern judicial activism 
began in 1895. In that year the Supreme Court struck down the 
federal income tax;2 severely restricted the Sherman Anti-trust 
Act;J and legitimized the labor injunction.4 A year later it began an 
energetic campaign against the Interstate Commerce Commission.s 
Smyth v. Ames6 in 1898 blocked effective utility and railroad rate 
regulation. Lochner v. New York 1 in 1905 incorporated laissez-faire 
into the fourteenth amendment, and killed a maximum-ten-hour 
workday for bakers. 
Two years later J. Allen Smith responded with The Spirit of 
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American Government-a then radically new version of the origins 
of the Constitution. The Supreme Court, he found, had not gone 
wild, it was merely doing what it had been designed to do: 
The Founding Fathers represented a reactionary movement against the idealism of 
the Revolution. Fearful for their privileges as representatives of a ... "well-to-do" 
class, they constructed a document with checks and balances exquisitely designed to 
inhibit the popular will . . . . Diluting for the sake of expediency and appearance 
the extreme centralized and undemocratic features of Hamilton's plan ... , the 
framers had, however, achieved his ends .... s 
Of the four organs of the new government, only the House of Rep-
resentatives was to be directly elected by the people. The terms of 
federal office were staggered (two, four, six years, and life). This 
would make popular capture of the whole extremely difficult--each 
of the three branches having "veto" or inhibiting powers vis-a-vis 
the others. A minority-controlled amending process would make 
improvements difficult. Finally, the crown jewel of the check-and-
balance system: a judicial veto. In Smith's view it was so blatantly 
anti-democratic that it could be included only implicitly-between 
the lines, so to speak.9 In due time judicial spokesmen for Hamil-
ton's "rich and the wellborn" would do what they were supposed to 
do; namely, provide a barrier against what Smith deemed the "only 
recognized source of legitimate authority," majority rule. 
As though to supplement Smith's efforts, Charles Beard pub-
lished The Supreme Court and the Constitution in 1912, and then 
his bombshell, An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the 
United States in 1913. The former was a response to "legal writers 
of respectable authority" who since 1895 had been arguing that ju-
dicial review was an illegitimate power. Beard examined the words 
and deeds of the framers of the Constitution, and as he later put it, 
"laid the ghost of judicial usurpation."1o Then in An Economic In-
terpretation, having examined property holdings of the individual 
framers, Beard offered empirical "proof" of Smith's thesis concern-
ing the economic predilections of the Founding Fathers: 
... not one [of them] represented in his immediate personal economic interests the 
small farming or mechanic classes. [More than 80 percent of the Founders] were 
immediately, directly and personally interested in the outcome of their labors at 
Philadelphia, and were to a greater or less extent economic beneficiaries from the 
adoption of the Constitution. II 
8. Stout, Introduction in J. SMITH, THE SPIRIT OF AMERICAN GoVERNMENT xxxii 
(1965). 
9. J. SMITH, supra note 8, at 108-109, 167. 
10. See C. BEARD, AN EcONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES (Macmillan ed. 1937). 
I I. /d. at 150. 
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Simultaneously Brooks Adams-scion of a famous family of 
patriots-offered The Theory of Social Revolutions. Beginning with 
Marbury, as he saw it, our courts had assumed sovereign powers 
including "a supreme function which can only be compared to the 
Dispensing Power claimed by the Stuarts, or the [ancient] authority 
... in the Church to 'grant Indulgences for reasonable causes.' " 
This power of granting immunity from the duty of obedience to 
legislation made the judiciary a political body, Adams thought, ever 
eager to reward its favorites, i.e. businessmen: 
The capitalist ... regards the constitutional form of government ... in the United 
States, as a convenient method of obtaining his own way against a majority, but the 
lawyer has learned to worship it as a fetish. Nor is this astonishing, for, were writ-
ten constitutions suppressed, he would lose most of his importance and much of his 
income. Quite honestly, therefore, the American lawyer has come to believe that a 
sheet of paper soiled with printers' ink and interpreted by half-a-dozen elderly 
gentlemen ... has some inherent and marvelous virtue by which it can arrest the 
march of omnipotent Nature.I2 
The Smith-Beard-Adams outlook reverberated throughout the 
academic world. Generations of students were trained in that tradi-
tion as old history and political science textbooks testify.B As re-
cently as 1943 Henry Steel Commager-a giant in the liberal 
tradition-repudiated judicial intrusion upon the political branches 
of government. In Majority Rule and Minority Rights he wasted 
few words on the usurpation issue: " ... atop all this [checking and 
balancing] there developed-! would not say there was estab-
lished-the practice of judicial review."I4 What was crucial for him 
was a principle repeatedly expressed "from the beginning to the end 
of Jefferson's career ... an unterrified and unflinching faith in ma-
jority rule.''I5 As Commager shows, Jefferson expresses that confi-
dence over and over. To those who objected, Jefferson's response 
was clear: 
I. If the people are led astray, they "will soon correct themselves." 
2. "(I]f we think them not enlightened enough to exercise their control (ade-
quately], ... the remedy is not to take it from them, but to inform their discre-
tion by education". 
3. If the foundation of just power is not in the majority, "Will it be in the minor-
ity? Or in an individual of that minority?" 
12. B. ADAMS, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL REVOLUTIONS 214-15 (1913). 
13. On the eve of Earl Warren's appointment to the bench a now famous political scien-
tist, W. H. Riker, wrote for the benefit of undergraduates: 
Judicial review was largely unanticipated. Its rationale reflects, therefore, experi-
ence, even historical accident, more than philosophy and constitutional plans .... 
Marbury v. Madison (1804) was ... more a legal trick than a serious precedent. 
W. RIKER, DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 240-41 (1953). 
14. H. COMMAGER, MAJORITY RULE AND MINORITY RIGHTS 6 (1943). 
15. /d. at 16. 
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4. If "man can not be trusted with the government of himself. ... [c)an he, then, 
be trusted with the government of others?" 16 
Commager concluded with Jefferson that "men need no masters-
not even judges." 11 
Only seventeen years later Charles Black's The People and the 
Court (1960) marked a watershed in liberal thinking-from Pro-
gressive and New Deal contempt for judicial activism to Warren-
era glorification; from rejection, to acceptance, of major policymak-
ing by judges. Black found "the preponderance of evidence" clearly 
indicates the founders intended judicial review.1s Then, undercut-
ting Smith, Beard, Adams, and Commager (to say nothing of Jeffer-
son), he insisted it "fits harmoniously into the democratic 
system."l9 This seminal effort by a gifted advocate-along with an-
other by Eugene Rostow in 1962-provided the groundwork for an 
outpouring of academic apologetics for Warrenism. Little if any-
thing was added to the Black-Rostow rationale, but the magnitude 
of the effort suggests "thou dost protest too much." For it is no 
small matter to reconcile judicial paternalism with the bedrock 
premise of democratic government; namely, that policymaking be-
longs to those who are politically accountable. The reconciliation 
effort included suggestions that we need not be much concerned 
with judges, for the rest of government is not so kosher either.2o 
Let us accept, as did Smith and Beard, the view that the fram-
ers probably intended the judicial veto. But what of Black's view 
that democracy and an activist judiciary are in harmony? His ra-
tionale was that: (1) "Congress and the President and the people 
could, if they wanted to, dismantle the institution .... "; and 
(2) "The premises of democracy are inarticulate and complex. But 
one proposition that is not among them . . . is the proposition that 
democracy requires that all decisions on policy be made by public 
opinion from day to day, or even by those departments that are 
most responsive to public opinion."21 
We may concede Black's second proposition, noting that as an 
argument in support of judicial activism, it entails a non sequitur. 
His first proposition proves far too much. It equates toleration 
(even helplessness) with acquiescence; it means the Czarist govern-
ment of Russia and the Bourbon government of France were demo-
16. /d. at 16-18. 
17. /d. at 82. 
18. C. BLACK, supra note I, at 23. 
19. !d. at 178-82. 
20. See response of McCleskey, Judicial Review in a Democracy: A Dissenting Opinion, 
3 Hous. L. REV. 345 (1966). 
21. C. BLACK, supra note I, at 178-79. 
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cratic. More immediately to the point, it means the judicial 
activism that prevailed in the four decades prior to 1937 was com-
patible with democracy. 
Obviously most scholars in the Progressive-New Deal era 
would have ridiculed Black's effort to justify the Court, just as they 
had ridiculed analogous efforts by the American Liberty League.22 
Conversely, Smith and Beard fared badly in the Age of Warren.23 
It would be incredible, if it were not true, that a scholar as capable 
as Charles Black could write a book on democracy and judicial re-
view without discussing the decades of Court abuse that began in 
1895-abuse that Black's academic predecessors (including surely 
his teachers) had roundly condemned. The fact is, one suggests, 
judicial review as we experienced it from 1895 to 1937 was blatantly 
in contempt of democracy. Our Blacks and Rostows simply do not 
face that difficulty. Nor did they (in the 1960's) recognize the possi-
bility of massive lawmaking by a future conservative (or reaction-
ary) Court. Their efforts are date-bound, tracts for the Age of 
Warren. They mistook benevolent oligarchy for democracy. 
The Black-Rostow position now seems to have outlived its day, 
at least in law-school circles. There a new generation of liberal 
scholars is mining and sapping the foundations of Warrenism. The 
attack is two-pronged. One finds classic expression in John Hart 
Ely's Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review (1980), 
which incidentally is dedicated to Earl Warren. Inspired by Stone's 
famous "footnote 4, "24 Ely rejects court excursions (negatively or 
positively) into substantive policy. He would confine review to safe-
guarding the democratic processes (broadly conceived): "Policing 
the Process of Representation," "Clearing the Channels of Political 
Change," "Facilitating the Representation of Minorities."2s The 
response to this "compromise" and to Jesse Choper's parallel effort, 
Judicial Review and the National Political Process (1980), suggests a 
more than passing interest in reform. 
Still there are difficulties-exposed, for example, in Ely's treat-
ment of the reapportionment cases.26 He approves them whole-
heartedly for helping to clear the channels of political change. One 
problem is that he starts with a questionable premise; namely, that 
22. See, e.g., Powell, Fifty-eight Lawyers Report, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. I I, 1935, 
at 119-121. 
23. See C. Strout, supra note 8, at xxxviii et seq.; R. BROWN, CHARLES BEARD AND 
THE CONSTITUTION (1956); F. McDONALD, WE THE PEOPLE: THE EcONOMIC ORIGINS OF 
THE CONSTITUTION (1958). 
24. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938). 
25. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 73, 105, 
135 (1980). 
26. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), and companion cases. 
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the beneficiaries of malapportionment "have a vested interest in 
keeping things as they are," leaving the "victims" essentially help-
less. Experience teaches a different lesson. The English got rid of 
their rotten boroughs through the political process. That, too, is 
how state after state repealed property qualifications on suffrage; 
how state after state rejected religious qualifications on suffrage; 
how state after state eliminated the poll tax (before the Court inter-
vened); how women got the vote; how eighteen, nineteen, and 
twenty year olds got the vote; and how we abolished the old system 
of selecting United States Senators, and deprived the electoral col-
lege of its power to choose Presidents. 
"We, the public," did not try much to kill malapportionment 
presumably because we did not find it much of a problem-just as 
we do not now consider gross malapportionment in the federal Sen-
ate much of a problem.21 A key ploy of the Warrenites-on and off 
the bench-was a broad, unspoken (and unexamined) assumption 
that, if voters and legislatures did not adopt forthwith a reform 
deemed important by activists, there must be a flaw in the political 
system. Ergo judicial intervention (including wholesale policymak-
ing) was justified. It seems never to have occurred to Court and 
campus activists that politics had not necessarily failed, but rather 
that the community simply did not want the reform in question.2s 
In any event by the end of the Warren era the Supreme Court had 
reached its nadir of esteem in public opinion polls.29 
Another hitch in Ely's effort is revealed in his view that the 
malapportionment decisions merely freed the political process of an 
27. Have we so soon forgotten that the purpose of the pre-Baker reapportionment 
"drive" was to free urban America from "rural domination"? Malapportioned state legisla-
tures, we were told, were responsible for the growing ills of city life. See G. BAKER, 4 RURAL 
VERSUS URBAN POLITICAL POWER, 27-39 (1955); THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, ONE 
MAN-ONE VOTE (1962); Kennedy, The Shame of the States, New York Times Magazine, 
May 18, 1958, at 12; Lewis, Legislative Apportionment and the Federal Courts, 71 HARV. L. 
REV. 1057, 1063 (I 958). Yet we have long since reapportioned without a hint of the prom-
ised renaissance of the cities. They still look more and more to the federal government for 
help. The persistence of their difficulties despite one-person-one-vote suggests causes and 
cures that have little to do with the apportionment of any legislative body. Unlike numerous 
academicians, "We the people"-free of blinding ideology and the never-never-land Dauer-
Kelsay Index of Representativeness-seem to have been correct in discounting the alleged 
rural sabotage of urban America. Incidentally the Dauer-Kelsay Index revealed that in 1962 
the federal Senate was so malapportioned as to permit sixteen percent of the voters to elect a 
majority of its members. In that pre-Reynolds year, only six state senates, and three state 
houses of representatives were more severely "malapportioned." 17 CouNCIL OF STATE 
GOVERNMENTS, THE BooK OF THE STATES 66-67 (I 969). 
28. For example, consider the abortion issue. A Gallup Newsweek Poll, NEWSWEEK, 
Jan. 14, 1985, at 22, indicates fifty-eight percent support for a ban on all abortions except in 
the case of rape, incest, or when the mother's life is endangered. Only thirty-six percent 
opposed such a ban. 
29. See New York Times, Aug. 17, 1969, §I, at 42, col. I. 
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impediment. But there is no unconstitutional "malapportionment" 
without a standard for determining what apportionments are mal. 
The Court simply selected and imposed upon us one of many theo-
ries of representation.Jo Ely approves. How easily in the name of 
process-purification he slips into substantive lawmaking! The con-
stitutional scheme for electing Presidents and Senators is utterly at 
odds with the Court's "one-person-one-vote" theory. Those, then, 
who gave us the Constitution could hardly have objected to "malap-
portionment." For, as the Warren Court recognized in the state 
senate case,Jt no matter how pure the representation in the house, 
the legislature will be impure, if the senate (a bottleneck) is impure. 
As Justices Frankfurter and Harlan observed in dissent, one-person-
one vote 
... was not the English system, it was not the colonial system, it was not the system 
chosen for the national government by the Constitution, it was not the system ex-
clusively or even predominantly practiced by the States at the time of adoption of 
the fourteenth amendment, it is not predominantly practiced by the States today.32 
The malapportionment decisions demonstrate the inadequacy 
of the judicial process in the face of the complex problem at issue. 
A catch-phrase (worthy of Madison Avenue) simply does not do the 
job. As Mr. Justice Douglas observed in dissent: "The question of 
the gerrymander is the other half of Reynolds v. Sims."33 One-per-
son-one-vote alone means merely that all gerrymandered and other 
voting districts in a given polity must be equal in population. This 
hardly gives protection against watered-down votes. Yet neither 
the Warren Court nor its successor has effectively challenged non-
racial gerrymandering-apparently finding it beyond the capacity 
of courts.34 The result is that today, though we have the comforting 
30. If equal weight for all votes was the goal, proportional representation would have 
been a better choice. 
31. Lucas v. General Assembly of Colorado, 377 U.S. 713 (1964). 
32. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 301 (1962). 
33. Whitcomb v. Chaviz, 403 U.S. 124, 176 (1971). 
34. In Whitcomb, Mr. Justice Douglas observed in dissent: 
It is said that if we prevent racial gerrymandering today, we must prevent gerry-
mandering of any special interest group tomorrow, whether it be social, economic, 
or ideological. I do not agree. Our constitution has a special thrust when it comes 
to voting; the Fifteenth Amendment says the right . . . to vote shall not be 
"abridged" on account of "race" .... 
/d. at 180. 
Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973), promises little prospect for court involve-
ment in non-racial gerrymandering. Post Script: Davis v. Brandemer, 106 S. Ct. 2797 
(1986), indicates that when unconstitutional vote dilution is alleged in the form of statewide 
political gerrymandering the judiciary will not attempt to cure mere lack of proportional 
representation, but may intervene when an electoral system is intended to, and does, consist-
ently degrade a voter's influence on the political process as a whole. 
One problem is that to district is to gerrymander in the sense that, however, it is done, it 
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catch-phrase, we are far from controlling malapportionment. For 
example, in the 1984 election Democrats "won" a fifty-eight percent 
majority in the federal House of Representatives, though they re-
ceived less than fifty-one percent of the total vote.Js Their minimal 
victory at the polls gave them nearly a three-to-two lead in House 
seats. Most of the reapportioning, as it happens, had been done by 
Democratic state legislatures. Regardless of the reason, the fact re-
mains: the minority party was underrepresented. The votes of its 
supporters had been (to borrow from Earl Warren) "diluted."36 
The second prong of the new, liberal reaction to Warrenism 
relates to form rather than substance. It does not reject activism, 
but rather make-believe in court opinions. There is no mystery in 
the fact that no Justice has ever tried in public to justify activism.37 
Wholesale lawmaking by judges is too utterly at odds with our long-
settled understanding of the judicial function. Accordingly those 
who "adjudicate" big changes into the law always pretend they are 
not doing so. The Douglas opinion in Griswold Js and the Warren 
opinions in Reynolds and Miranda are classic examples. What 
Thomas Reed Powell said years ago of the old activists is equally 
applicable to the new ones: 
[They] seek to impress upon us in effect that it is not they who speak but the Consti-
tution that speaketh in them . . . . It will ever remain a mystery to me how intelli-
will benefit some voters at the expense of others. One-person-one-vote might prevent diluted 
votes, if all interests were uniform in strength and spread uniformly throughout the polity. In 
the real world they are not thus homogenized. Some interest groups are large, some small; 
some are geographically compact, some widespread, and some spotty; some have advantages 
of prestige, some of organization, and some of dedication--others are correspondingly handi-
capped. The result is layered, crazy-quilt patterns of changing interests. Equal sized voting 
districts imposed on such an uneven base are bound to produce uneven results, i.e., "diluted" 
votes, or what might be called inadvertent gerrymandering. Consider, for example, a polity 
divided into equal sized districts first by north-south boundary lines, and then alternatively by 
east-west lines. Because of the uneven interest-base the former almost certainly would favor 
one set of voters; the latter another. Yet both satisfy the Reynolds v. Sims test of size equality. 
When Sims was decided in 1964 perhaps it could be argued that the requirement of 
district size-equality would make gerrymandering difficult to achieve. The advent of district-
ing by computer throughly undercut that proposition! 
35. The Wall Street Journal, Nov. 26, 1984 at 34, col I; Cf, Ornstein, Genesis of a 
Gerrymander, id. May 7, 1985, at 30, col. 3. See also note 27, supra. 
36. It is ironic that, though the Supreme Court has shown scant interest in gerryman-
ders, it has been a martinet with respect to numbers-equality in congressional districting. 
Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725 (1983), struck down as excessive a seven-tenths of one 
percent deviation. 
37. Post Script: But see Justice Brennan's speech at Georgetown University on October 
12, 1985 entitled "The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification." 
There, after a salute to "interpretivism," he goes far along the "non-interpretive" path. N.Y. 
Times, Oct. 13, 1985, § I, at I, col. I, and 36, col. 4 (excerpts). 
38. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
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gent jurists can make these professions of non participation in the judicial process. 39 
Equally "perplexed," a new group of liberal critics calls-at 
least by implication-for candor in Court opinions. 40 The classic 
statement of this outlook is Thomas Grey's Do We Have an Unwrit-
ten Constitution? (1975). A few years earlier a respected historian 
had suggested in some detail that the Court's use of history to jus-
tify its results is often "illicit," simplistic, manipulative, and plainly 
misleading. So many others reached similar conclusions that at the 
end of the Warren regime a liberal, Pulitzer Prize-winning historian 
observed (with documentation): 
By now we all know the notorious fact: the Supreme Court has flunked history. 
The justices stand censured for abusing historical evidence in a way that reflects 
adversely on their intellectual rectitude .... 41 
In the interest of integrity (vis-a-vis the open-ended provisions of 
the Constitution) Grey would abandon fairy-tale "interpretivism" 
in favor of open, candid "non-interpretivism." This dichotomy is 
now a major battle zone in legal literature. Its significance for pres-
ent purposes is that it reveals a widespread disenchantment with 
activist make-believe as, for example, in Griswold and Reynolds. 
Our concern here is not who is right or wrong, but rather: how 
can outstanding scholars derive such changing and conflicting con-
clusions from the same data? The question is perhaps naive. Still 
let Charles Black-panegyrist of Warrenism-suggests an answer, 
if only by implication. Deeply wounded by the Burger Court's "re-
instatement" of the death penalty, he wonders lately "whether we 
liberals ... may not be in part to blame for a ... quite evident trend 
toward the point of view that reason doesn't matter much, and can 
be brushed aside, if only the result is thought desirable . . . . What if 
all this is turned on us? . . . Have we not ... asked for it?"42 
Earlier Edward S. Corwin-perhaps the leading political scien-
39. T. POWELL, VAGARIES AND VARIETIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 28 
(1956). 
40. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), is of course the classic case of early, 
laissez-faire judicial activism. In it the Court's innocence and candor are refreshing: "There 
is, in our judgment, no reasonable foundation for holding this to be necessary or appropriate 
as a health law .... " /d. at 58. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), is Lochner's 
modern counterpart. Note there the Court's painful effort to find a privacy right to copulate 
with contraceptives implicit in "penumbras formed by emanations" from our eighteenth-cen-
tury Bill of Rights allegedly made applicable to Connecticut by a fair-trial provision in a 
Civil-War-Reconstruction amendment. /d. at 480-86. 
41. Levy, The Right Against Self-Incrimination: History and Judicial History, 84 POL. 
SCI. Q. I (1969). 
42. "The Judicial Power as Guardian of Liberties" in a symposium on The Supreme 
Court and Constitutional Liberties in Modern America, Wayne State University, Detroit, 
Michigan, October 16, 1976. (quoted in R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY, 346, 350 
(1977)). 
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tist of his day-had a similar change of heart. In 1914 he had con-
cluded (as had Beard in 1912) that the framers clearly intended a 
judicial veto over Congress: " . . . it cannot be reasonably 
doubted."43 But when longstanding liberal opposition to the Court 
produced the "Court fight" crisis of 1937, Corwin said, "The people 
who say the framers intended it are talking nonsense [as are those 
who claim the opposite.]"44 So too, but conversely, Commager had 
second thoughts. In the heyday of Warrenism, twenty-three years 
after his Majority Rule and Minority Rights, he returned to the 
problem of judicial review in a democracy, he tells us, "with . . . a 
somewhat livelier concern for its complexities."4s The Court had 
become "liberal"! 
The contradictory conclusions and vacillations of leading 
scholars suggest a large measure of "statesmanship" in their efforts. 
Their twistings and turnings are directly related to the shift of the 
Court from very "conservative" to very "liberal," and now back 
again to "conservatism" (with a threat of more to come). Ely, 
Choper, and the new Black may be straws in an academic wind 
blowing away from activism on the bench. That wind may become 
a gale, if President Reagan has his way with the Court. If liberals 
should now embrace judicial restraint, that would be merely a re-
turn to their stance throughout American history-save the brief 
Warren-inspired lapse. It would spare us their make-believe of pre-
tended "interpretivism." It would spare us the embarrassment of 
tract-for-the-moment scholarship a Ia Smith, Beard, Black and Ros-
tow. It would spare us the timely reconsiderations of our Corwins, 
Commagers, and Charles Blacks. We would not have to pretend 
that activism is democratic when it promotes liberal values (e.g., 
Griswold privacy), yet antidemocratic when it promotes conserva-
tive values (e.g., Lochner privacy).46 
43. E. CORWIN, THE DocTRINE OF JuDICIAL REVIEW 10 (1914). 
44. Reorganization of the Federal Judiciary: Hearings on S. 1392 Before the Committee 
on the Judiciary, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., Part 2 (1937) (statement of EdwardS. Corwin). 
45. H. COMMAGER, FREEDOM AND ORDER: A CoMMENTARY ON THE AMERICAN 
POLITICAL ScENE vii (1966). 
46. The Court's rationalization in either of these cases will support the result in the 
other. Some may find in Griswold a less than candid approach that would support judicial 
veto, or judicial "enactment," of virtually any legislative policy. For example, it "legiti-
mates" (Charles Black's term) Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), wherein, we are told, the 
Constitution divides the period of human gestation into trimesters and prescribes in some 
detail the varying scope of "privacy" appropriate to each. 
